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ENTERING THE SOUND RECORDING
PERFORMANCE RIGHT LABYRINTH:
DEFINING INTERACTIVE SERVICES AND THE
BROADCAST EXEMPTION
Steven M. Marks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Internet has proven fertile ground for
entrepreneurs to create new businesses in a broad range of industries. The
recording industry is no exception. A proliferation of online music sites
offering unique services has developed in the past several years,' spurred
by the fact that music is particularly well-suited for performance 2 on the
Internet, compared to other creative works.
When the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995' ("DPRSRA") was passed, neither Congress nor any of the parties
involved appreciated that the Internet would be the testing ground for many
of the DPRSRA's provisions. In fact, the legislative history barely
mentions the Internet. Yet it was the introduction and rapid growth of
* Steven M. Marks is Senior Vice President, Business Affairs for the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA"), concentrating on Internet and other technology-related legal,
licensing and legislative matters. Mr. Marks led negotiations on behalf of the recording industry
that resulted in the recent amendments to the Copyright Act, and currently directs industry
negotiations for Internet licensing. J.D., Duke Law School, 1992; B.A., Duke University, 1988.
1. As described infra note 20, the primary mechanism for performing sound recordings and
other media in real time on the Internet is generally known as "streaming." Due to the limited
bandwidth available to most Internet users today, many creative works such as movies or books
are too cumbersome to perform on the Internet. Sound recordings, on the other hand, can be
encoded in relatively small files so listening to music over the Internet is practical for most users,
even at slower connection speeds.
2. This Article is limited to a discussion of the performance of sound recordings. The laws
governing, and means of, reproducing and distributing recordings are not addressed.
3. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
4. See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 22, 36 (1995); see also Reply Comments of Mark Cuban at 5
n. 1, In re Revisions of the Cable and Satellite Carrier Compulsory Licenses, Copyright Office
Docket No. RM 97-1, Comment Letter No. 30 (June 20, 1997) ("Services like [Broadcast.com]
were not known to exist at the time of the [DPRSRA], and the impact of such services and their
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music services on the Internet that prompted Congress to amend the
DPRSRA through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 5 ("DMCA") in
1998.6
This Article discusses two brewing controversies regarding the scope
of sound recording performance rights. The first issue is how to apply the
revised definition of "interactive service" to personalized music services.
The second issue is whether an exemption granted for certain Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC")-licensed broadcasts applies to the
Internet and beyond. Although both issues have arisen due to the use of
recordings on the Internet, resolving these issues will undoubtedly have
effects on the performance rights for recordings in other digital media.7
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUND RECORDING PERFORMANCE RIGHT
Before the DPRSRA took effect in 1996,8 a sound recording 9 was the
only copyrighted work not accorded a federal right of public
performance.10 In other words, a composer had rights when the song was
publicly performed, such as on broadcast radio, but the artist performing
the song did not enjoy similar rights." Additionally, while copyright
benefits to the public could not have been considered by Congress when enacting section 114.")
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
5. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
6. Id.
7. Neither the terms of the DPRSRA nor the amendments in the DMCA are limited to any
particular digital medium in which sound recordings might be performed. Rather, the sound
recording performance right applies to all performances by means of digital transmission, whether
via the Internet, cable, satellite or other digital technology. See 17 U.S.C. §1140)(3) (Supp. IV
1998); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 25 (1995).
8. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, §
6, 109 Stat. 336, 349 (1995).
9. Two copyrighted works are embodied in a recording of music. The first is the underlying
musical composition, comprised of composed music and written lyrics. Copyright law refers to
this as a "musical work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1994). The second copyrighted work is the
sound recording-the fixation of sounds, including the recording artist's interpretation of the
musical composition. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A sound recording is fixed if it can be
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration." Id.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994) (granting exclusive right of public performance for
literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic and audiovisual works and pantomimes). In fact, it
was not until 1972 that federal copyright law even protected sound recordings from unauthorized
reproduction and distribution. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(commonly referred to as the "Sound Recording Act").
11. The disparate treatment of sound recordings can be explained largely as a historical
anomaly. At the time of the Copyright Act of 1909, sound recordings were still at the stage of the
wax cylinder and were not granted copyright protection. Until 1940, this was of little economic
import because recording artists' livelihood was derived from live performances. Eventually, live
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owners of sound recordings enjoyed a right of public performance in other
countries, performances in the United States remained uncompensated.
12
Before the DPRSRA was enacted, copyright owners of sound
recordings repeatedly attempted to remedy this inequity. In 1978, the
Copyright Office issued a report endorsing the creation of a performance
right in sound recordings. 13 However, strong opposition from broadcasters
repeatedly thwarted the enactment of such a performance right. 14
Support for sound recording performance rights grew with the advent
of digital transmission technology. In 1991, the Copyright Office reiterated
its previous endorsement, 15 but also concluded "the introduction of digital
audio transmission services will increase the potential for economic harm
to copyright owners of recorded works."' 6  Eventually, broadcaster
opposition succumbed to political compromise in the form of the
DPRSRA. 17  The DPRSRA granted an exclusive right to perform sound
recordings, but limited the right to digital transmissions. 18 The legislation
was further limited by a number of exemptions and a statutory license for
certain subscription, non-interactive services.' 9
performances gave way to radio play and the growing commercial popularity of recordings and
home players. These two events combined to deprive artists of performance income. See, e.g.,
Performance Royalty: Hearing on S. Jill Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 11 (1975) (statement of Barbara Ringer,
Register of Copyrights that "performers were whipsawed by an unmerciful process in which their
vast live audiences were destroyed by phonograph records and broadcasting, but they were given
no legal rights whatever to control or participate in the commercial benefits of the vast new
electronic audience").
12. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[D], at 8-
292 to 8-293 (1999). "[A]s a general matter most important territories afford [sound recording
performance rights protection] under the Rome Convention." Id. at § 8.21[D], at 8-292 (citations
omitted); see also REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL AUDIO
TRANSMISSION SERVICES 156 (1991) [hereinafter "COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS"]. This lack of
performance right is a huge loss to American sound recording copyright owners. In 1990, United
Kingdom sound recording performance royalties collected actually exceeded £130 million. See
id. at 19-20.
13. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN
SOUND RECORDINGS (Comm. Print 1978).
14. See COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS, supra note 12, at 145; see also Lionel S. Sobel, A New
Music Law for the Age of Digital Technology, 17 ENT. L. REP. 3, 4 (1995).
15. COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS, supra note 13, at xii. "The omission of the performance
right in sound recordings is an anomaly in the copyright laws without substantial justification."
Id.
16. Id.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 12 (1995) (noting a digital performance right for sound
recordings, as opposed to a comprehensive performance right, addressed the concerns of the
recording industry without "upsetting the longstanding business and contractual relationships"
with broadcasters).
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. IV 1998). "[T]o perform the copyrighted work publicly
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Shortly after the DPRSRA took effect on February 1, 1996, the
landscape for digitally transmitted sound recordings began to change
radically. Most significantly, technology became available to "stream"
music in real time on the Internet from websites through a process
commonly referred to as webcasting. 20 This technology enabled anyone
with Internet access to perform sound recordings worldwide merely by
setting up a personal computer. The result was the ability to bypass the
significant infrastructure necessary for traditional over-the-air broadcasting
or cable or satellite transmission.
Problems began to arise because most, if not all, of the new Internet
music services were offered on a nonsubscription basis, creating confusion
about how DPRSRA provisions applied.2' The statutory license created by
the DPRSRA was limited to subscription services, thereby leaving
nonsubscription services to the exclusive rights of copyright owners absent
eligibility for an enumerated exception.22 For example, webcasters argued
that nonsubscription webcasts fell within the exemption for "a
nonsubscription transmission other than a retransmission., 23 Copyright
owners disagreed, and further relied upon the fact that reproductions of
sound recordings made in a webcaster's computer server in order to stream
music required licenses because they did not qualify for the Copyright
24 teasest hsAct's ephemeral recording exemption. Whatever the answers to these
legal questions might have been, it was clear that without a quick resolution
the webcasting business would be fraught with uncertainty.
The pending DMCA25 provided a vehicle to remedy this uncertainty.
According to Congress, a primary goal of the DMCA amendments to the
by means of a digital audio transmission." Id.
19. See generally id.; 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (Supp. 11I 1997) (amended 1998). The exemptions
and statutory license produced a framework described, rightly so, as virtually "incomprehensible"
and more complex than the Internal Revenue Code. See Sobel, supra note 14, at 3. Exemptions
range from several for certain FCC-licensed broadcast transmissions and retransmissions to
transmissions within or to a business establishment. See infra Part IV.
20. Streaming technology enables sound recordings to be transmitted (as opposed to
downloaded for permanent retention) to a personal computer in an encoded format that can be
played with a software media player. Generally speaking, streaming works by sending packets of
audio data that are buffered in the random access memory of a computer, where the packets are
organized sequentially and decoded for playback.
21. For examples of non-subscription based internet music services, visit www.spinner.com,
www.broadcast.com and www.radiomoi.com.
22. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(l)-(3) (Supp. III 1997) (amended 1998).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1994 & Supp. 1111997) (amended 1998).
25. The DMCA began as legislation to implement certain obligations from the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, namely prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of devices designed to
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DPRSRA was "to create fair and efficient licensing mechanisms that
address the complex issues facing copyright owners and copyright users as
a result of the rapid growth of digital audio services. 26  Specifically, the
solution was to extend the DPRSRA's license for subscription services to
nonsubscription services.2 7 This solution recognized that the distinction
between subscription and nonsubscription services, while relevant to rates
and terms, should not determine whether a service is eligible for statutory
licensing.28 In addition to covering nonsubscription digital transmissions,
the DMCA added new terms to the statutory license and established a
marketplace test for setting rates.29
III. CUSTOMIZED SERVICES: A CASE STUDY OF THE SCOPE OF
INTERACTIVITY
A. Interactive Service Under the DPRSRA
The DPRSRA granted exclusive rights to copyright owners for any
digital transmissions made as part of an "interactive service. 30  The
DPRSRA defined interactive service as "one that enables a member of the
public to receive ... on request ... a transmission of a particular sound
recording... selected by or on behalf of the recipient.",3' The purpose of
this definition was to address the potential for certain services to adversely
impact the sales of sound recordings.32  One example of a threat to sound
circumvent technological measures that protect copyrighted material and protect copyright
management information. See H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, pt. 2, at 20 (1998). The DMCA also dealt
with many other related issues such as the responsibilities of on-line service providers when
transmitting copyrighted works. See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2877, 2877-86 (1998) (codified as enacted at 17 U.S.C. §
512 (Supp. IV 1998)).
26. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 79-80 (1998).
27. See id. at 80 (discussing the extension of the statutory license to "certain eligible
nonsubscription transmissions").
28. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at80 (1998).
29. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1998); see also 17 U.S.C. §
114(f)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1998) (changing the criteria for establishing rates from four policy-
orientated objectives specified in 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) to a marketplace test).
30. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (Supp. m11 1997) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
1140)(7) (Supp. IV 1998) (stating exemptions described apply if transmissions are "other than as
a part of an interactive service"); 17 U.S.C. § 1 14(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1997) (stating requirement
for statutory license that "the transmission is not part of an interactive service").
31. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7)).
32. The legislative history of the DPRSRA contains numerous statements supporting this
interpretation. For example, Congress pointed out "[o]f all the new forms of digital transmission
services, interactive services are most likely to have a significant impact on traditional record
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recording sales was a "celestial jukebox" containing thousands of sound
recordings available for listeners to hear recordings on demand, which
might deter sales by providing users the ability to hear music of their
choice at any time.
33
Congress left sound recording copyright owners with "the right to
negotiate the terms of licenses granted to interactive services. 34 Congress
recognized copyright owners are in the best position to determine the
economic terms on which to license interactive services. 35 It is important
to emphasize that the DPRSRA did not prohibit interactive services; rather,
the law granted sound recording copyright owners the same discretion to
license their creative works enjoyed by most other copyright owners.
36
As webcasting began to proliferate, many Internet services offered
music in unique ways, challenging the DPRSRA's definition of an
interactive service. Although many webcasters offered programming that
seemed to fit within Congress' underlying purpose, the narrow definition of
interactive service as one offering recordings on demand threw into doubt
whether such services could be considered interactive.
For example, some services offered files of pre-recorded programs
that users could play repeatedly because they were "archived" on a
website.3 v The shorter the archived program, the easier it was to choose a
particular recording on demand. Often, the interactive nature of archived
programs was significantly enhanced by the use of "rewind" and "fast-
forward" functions, which permitted users to navigate quickly to the song
of their choice.
Other services permitted users to customize music by interacting with
the site. For example, at least one service allowed users to create their own
programs by selecting and rating particular artists.38 Based on these
settings, which could be saved and altered as desired, the site allowed the
user to create personalized programs according to the user's taste.39
sales, and therefore pose the greatest threat to the livelihoods of those whose income depends
upon revenues derived from traditional record sales." H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 14 (1995).
33. See 141 CONG. REc. S11953 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1995).
34. S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 24 (1995).
35. See generally id.
36. See id. at 24-25.
37. See, e.g., www.broadcast.com.
38. See P.J. Huffstutter, The Cutting Edge: Focus on Technology; Cyberspace; Web Surfing
for the Next Wave in Radio, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at C3 (discussing Imagine Radio
(www.imagineradio.com) and how their services work).
39. See id. Imagine Radio was acquired by MTV in February 1999, for $14.5 million after
being in business for less than one year. See Dan Fost, 2 Net Entrepreneurs Making Noise Over
MTV Deal, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1999, at B2.
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Thus, although the DPRSRA granted broad rights to sound recording
copyright owners with regard to interactive services, the statutory language
was inadequate to address new functionalities employed by internet music
services. Even if the law could not keep pace with changing technology, it
needed to keep it in sight.
B. The DMCA and the Evolution of Interactive Service
The DMCA provided a means of amending the DPRSRA that
captured the purpose behind granting copyright owners exclusive rights for
interactive services. Two concepts guided the evolution of the definition of
interactivity. First, interactivity is best understood as a continuum that
accommodates a variety of services, rather than merely those that offer
recordings on demand, such as a jukebox service. Along this continuum,
services range from less to more interactive, depending on the degree of
choice offered to the user. Thus, services that permit a choice of recordings
within a predetermined program should be considered interactive, even
though they may not have the same degree of interactivity as a service that
permits a choice of particular recordings from an exhaustive database.
a
4
Second, the predictability of a service should be a primary factor in
defining it as interactive or noninteractive. Services that fall within the
statutory license are predicated on the random play of recordings, much
like tuning into a particular broadcast radio station. On the radio, choice is
limited to a program of music delivered to all who tune in, without
permitting an individual to control or influence the program.4'
With these concepts in mind, Congress amended the definition of
interactive service in several respects. The DMCA amendments illustrate
that Congress recognized the concept of interactivity should not be tied to
the mechanical selection of particular recordings. The new definition reads
as follows:
An "interactive service" is one that enables a member of the
public to receive a transmission of a program specially created
for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular
sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is
selected by or on behalf of the recipient. The ability of
individuals to request that particular sound recordings be
performed for reception by the public at large, or in the case of a
subscription service, by all subscribers of the service, does not
make a service interactive, if the programming on each channel
40. See H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 105-796, at 41 (1998).
41. Id. at 87.
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of the service does not substantially consist of sound recordings
that are performed within 1 hour of the request or at a time
designated by either the transmitting entity or the individual
making such request. If an entity offers both interactive and
noninteractive services (either concurrently or at different
times), the noninteractive component shall not be treated as part
42of an interactive service.
The first amendment to the definition of interactive service specifies
that a transmission of a program "specially created for the recipient" is
considered interactive.43 This change was designed to address the practice
of offering customized or personalized programs to individual recipients.
44
The legislative history makes clear a program is interactive even if the
recipient has not chosen particular songs but has influenced the program in
other ways. For example, "the recipient might identify certain artists that
become the basis of the personal program.
45
Second, the definition of interactive service and new provisions of the
statutory license make clear archived programming falls within the
exclusive rights of copyright owners, except in limited circumstances." A
service that permits recipients of a program to navigate with rewind or fast-
forward functions is also considered interactive.47 Again, the legislative
history explains that a recipient need not "select the actual songs that
comprise the program" in order to create an interactive effect.
48
The third change to the definition of interactive service also illustrates
Congress' intent to distinguish between traditional random programming
and more customized offerings. The new definition clarifies individuals
may request particular recordings as long as 1) they are performed for
reception by the public at large; and 2) the programming on the service
does not substantially consist of sound recordings performed within one
hour of the request or at a designated time.49 The intent of these changes
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) (Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) (Supp. IV 1998); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 87 (1998).
44. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 87 (1998).
45. Id.
46. A new term of the statutory license requires that an "archived program" be at least five
hours in duration and available for no more than two weeks. See 17 U.S.C. § I14(d)(2)(C)(iii)
(Supp. IV 1998). Thus, an archived program that does not meet this requirement or permits users
to skip back and forth in the program must be licensed by the copyright owner directly.
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7) ("An 'interactive service' is one that enables a member of the
public to receive ... on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as
part of a program ....") (emphasis added).
48. H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 105-796, at 88 (1998).
49. Id.
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was to clarify that "a service that engaged in the typical broadcast
programming practice of including selections requested by listeners would
not be considered interactive. 5°
The result of these amendments is to establish two distinct ways in
which a programming service may be considered interactive. The first is
that programming "specially created for the recipient" is interactive.5' The
second is that requests or selections of recordings by individuals-whether
on demand or as part of an existing program-are interactive except under
certain circumstances.
C. Why Customized Services Are Interactive
Since the enactment of the DMCA, an increasing number of
webcasters have begun to offer users some degree of control over the
programs offered in order to allow users to customize or personalize
programming. These services give consumers the power to "decide what
music you hear and how often. 52 This section briefly addresses whether
these services fall within the new definition of interactive service, or may
qualify for the statutory license.53
Consider the following: an internet radio service allows users to
create their own "station." The station initially plays music based on the
user's preferences. Users may then refine the station by rating songs,
50. See id. at 87-88; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7).
52. See <www.radio.sonicnet.com> (describing My radio.sonicnet Station service); see also
Christopher Jones, Dueling Over Digital Music Rights (visited April 3, 2000)
<http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,34114,00.html> (these services aim to give consumers
"access to their music when they want it") (quoting John Parres of Beverly Hills-based Artist
Management Group).
53. This issue is hardly academic. On April 17, 2000, certain webcasters, through the
Digital Media Association ("DiMA"), asked the Copyright Office to initiate a rulemaking
proceeding to resolve whether certain types of customer-influenced programming are interactive
or eligible for the statutory license. See Preliminary Statement and Need for Rulemaking for the
Digital Media Association, In re Section 114 Definition of Interactive Service, Copyright Office
Docket No. RM 2000-4 (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Review). Specifically, DiMA asked the Copyright Office to rule that a webcasting service
offering consumer influence should not be considered interactive if it: 1) makes transmissions
that are made available to the public generally; 2) does not enable listeners to know in advance
which sound recordings will be transmitted at any particular time; and 3) makes transmissions
that do not substantially consist of sound recordings performed within one hour of a request or at
a time designated by the transmitting entity or the individual making the request. See id. at 2.
The Copyright Office has asked interested parties to comment on whether a rulemaking
proceeding should be initiated. See Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a
Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,266-68 (2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (request for
comments May 23, 2000). The following discussion addresses arguments raised both in DiMA's
Petition for Rulemaking as well as those raised by other webcasters.
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albums or artists on a scale from zero to one hundred. While higher rated
songs, albums or artists are played more often on a station, those with
lower ratings would be played less often or removed from the rotation. Is
such a service interactive?
The dispositive question is whether such a program is "specially
created for the recipient., 54 This statutory language appears to present a
straightforward test: if the service designs and sends a program to an
individual based on input by that individual, then the service is interactive.
The input is not limited to selecting recordings, but can be comprised of
any choices made by the recipient. The legislative history explains "the
recipient.., need not select the particular recordings in the program for it
to be considered personalized., 55  For example, "the recipient might
identify certain artists that become the basis of the personal program.
56
Some webcasters have argued a customized program that otherwise
complies with the terms of the statutory license is not interactive. For
example, an algorithm might modify user input so the program complies
with the specific terms of the statutory license, such as the sound recording
performance complement.5 7 But this modification would not change the
fact that the program is "specially created for the recipient." Indeed, taken
to its logical conclusion, this argument would render even on-demand
services noninteractive as long as the service abided by the statutory license
programming terms. Whether such a service is interactive is a separate
question from whether it complies with these conditions, and compliance
with these conditions does not make the service noninteractive.
Some webcasters have also argued a program is not interactive even if
it is specially created for the recipient, as long as it is also made available
to the general public. They rely in part on legislative history that states,
"[A] service would not be interactive it if merely transmitted to a large
number of recipients of the service's transmissions a program consisting of
sound recordings requested by a small number of those listeners. 5 ' The
better interpretation is that this provision allows traditional features like a
radio "request line" to be used by webcasters, but does not permit creation
54. 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7).
55. 144 CONG. REc. H10071 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998).
56. Id.
57. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(2)(C)(I), 114(j)(13) (Supp. 1V 1998). The sound recording
performance complement forbids statutory licensees from intentionally or unintentionally
transmitting, during any three hour period, more than 1) three selections from any one record,
only two of which can be played consecutively, or 2) four songs from the same artist or
compilation album, only three of which can be played consecutively. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)
(Supp. IV 1998) (defining sound recording performance complement).
58. See 144 CONG. REC. H10071 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998).
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of personalized programs. A contrary result would subvert the purpose of
the statute by providing a loophole if the service merely made each
customized program available for others.
Other webcasters have argued the classification of a service as
interactive should turn on whether the service actually adversely impacts
recording sales. In support, one could point to the DPRSRA legislative
history discussion about how interactive services should fall within the
exclusive rights of copyright owners because they have potential to
interfere with traditional sales.59 However, neither the statute nor the
legislative history require a showing that sales are adversely affected before
that service may be considered interactive.60  Rather, Congress has
determined that certain types of services-such as those offering on
demand or personalized programming-are so different in character from
the random programming eligible for statutory license and so likely to
adversely impact recording sales that they are subject to the copyright
owner's exclusive rights regardless of actual harm.
Again, the opposite conclusion would create perverse results. First, it
would require a case-by-case judicial analysis of whether a particular
service actually affected sales-leading to expensive litigation for every
new service offering a unique type of personalization. Indeed, one could
imagine that two sites offering precisely the same personalized
programming could differ in this regard due to facts or circumstances
entirely irrelevant to the programming. Second, the determination of
whether a particular service is interactive could turn on factors such as
technology used to deliver the music. If an on-demand service offers music
in a low quality stream, it could be argued the sound quality makes it
unlikely that recording sales would be impacted. In fact, the same service
could offer both high quality streams to some listeners and lower quality to
others, as most webcasters do, thus rendering some programming
interactive in some instances but not others.
Finally, there is the question of whether limiting user input to the
selection of a number of genres to combine together as one station should
be interactive. It seems clear a service that offers a number of pre-
programmed, highly-themed genre stations to the public at large is not
interactive. Therefore, some webcasters have argued that permitting a user
59. See 141 CONG. REC. S 11953 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1995).
60. Congress' concern of an impact on sales is often misconstrued as relating only to home
taping. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 12 (1995). Rather, the concern also encom-
passes the substitutional affect that, for example, customized programming may have because
listeners might substitute the ability to hear precisely the artists or type of music they choose at
any given time for purchasing albums. See generally id.
320 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 20:309
to combine several different genres should not be considered interactive,
especially if the user's genres are broader than those on the pre-
programmed service. The webcasters rely in part on the fact that the
example of personalized programming outlined in the legislative history
addresses the choosing of specific artists, 61 which is more akin to selecting
particular recordings than to customizing broad genres.
While not as obvious on its face as personalized stations based on
selection of recordings or artists, genre personalized services should be
considered interactive.62 The statutory language does not distinguish
between artist and genre personalization any more than it distinguishes
between customization based on year of release, number of records sold or
country of origin. And while the legislative history uses the example of
choosing particular artists, that language is not meant to be limiting given it
is introduced by the words "for example. 63 Moreover, it is conceivable
that rating narrow genres with few artists may be similar to rating particular
artists and even rating broad genres could displace sales of genre-specific
compilation albums.
Thus, any programming customized for an individual listener falls
within the new definition of interactive service. While customized
programs may differ as to the degree of choice provided, those distinctions
do not take them out of the definition of interactive service so long as they
create programs for individual listeners, and are relevant only to where a
particular service is plotted on the continuum of interactivity.
IV. ARE WEBCASTS OF OVER-THE-AIR RADIO PROGRAMMING BY
Fcc-LICENSED STATIONS EXEMPT?
When the DPRSRA was enacted, broadcasters distinguished
themselves from new digital audio services by emphasizing their "statutory
obligation to serve the needs and interests of the communities to which
they are licensed." 64 Eventually, Congress accommodated both the need
for a new right of public performance for sound recordings in the digital
world and the concerns of the broadcasters by providing an exemption for
"nonsubscription broadcast transmission[s]" ("broadcast exemption").65
61. See 144 CONG. REC. H10071.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 114()(7).
63. See 144 CONG. REC. H10071.
64. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act: Hearings on H.R. 1506 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 86 (1995) (statement of Edward 0. Fritts, National Ass'n of Broadcasters).
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998); 141 CONG. REc. H10098 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1995) ("The performance of a sound recording publicly by means of a digital audio
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In 1995, when Congress enacted the DPRSRA, the scope of the
broadcast exemption appeared to be limited to local over-the-air broadcasts
where the signal was converted from analog to digital. But since the time
of the DPRSRA, thousands of radio stations have begun to webcast their
over-the-air signal on the Internet.66 Furthermore, many broadcasters,
including the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB"), now take the
position that such internet webcasts fall within the broadcast exemption.67
The following discussion explains why the broadcast exemption should be
construed narrowly to cover only digital transmissions of over-the-air
broadcasts.
68
transmission, other than as part of an interactive service, is not an infringement of section 106(6)
if the performance is part of... a nonsubscription transmission other than a retransmission.").
66. See BRS Media, Web-Radio Stats (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http://www.brsradio.com/
iradio/analysis.htm> (providing statistics as of December 1998).
67. See Comments of AMFM, Inc. et al. at 3, 12-32, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Regarding Public Performance Of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office
Docket No. RM 2000-3, Comment Letter No. 5 (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Entertainment Law Review); Copyright Office to Settle Dispute Over Streaming Audio
Fees, AuDio WEEK, Mar. 20, 2000 (quoting National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB")
spokesman as saying, "[olur position is... we don't believe we are required to pay performance
rights for streaming of signals over the Internet"); Reply Comments of the National Association
of Broadcasters at 9-12, In re Revisions of the Cable and Satellite Carrier Compulsory Licenses,
Copyright Office Docket No. RM 97-1, Comment Letter No. 30 (June 20, 1997) (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
68. On March 1, 2000, the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") asked the
United States Copyright Office to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to determine the scope of the
broadcast exemption. See Petition for Rulemaking for the Recording Industry Association of
America at 1, In the Matter of Section 112 and 114 Licenses; Webcasting of AM and FM Radio
Stations By Broadcasters, Copyright Office Docket No. RM 2000-3 (Mar. 1, 2000) (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review). On March 16, the Copyright Office
initiated a rulemaking proceeding and published a notice in the Federal Register requesting
comments on the RIAA's petition by April 17. See Public Performance of Sound Recordings:
Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,227-28 (2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201)
(notice of proposed rulemaking Mar. 16, 2000). The Copyright Office asked for comments on
two questions: whether it should resolve the issue and, if so, how the issue should be resolved.
See id. On March 27, 2000, the NAB filed a declaratory judgment action against the RIAA in the
Southern District of New York. See Plaintiff's Complaint, National Ass'n of Broad. v. Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. 00 Civ. 2330 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2000) (on file with the Loyola ofLos
Angeles Entertainment Law Review). The NAB action requests the court to declare the
broadcaster exemption covers webcasts by an FCC-licensed broadcast radio station of its over-
the-air programming. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 9, National Ass "n of Broad. (No. 00 Civ.
2330). The NAB then asked the Copyright Office to suspend its rulemaking proceeding pending
the outcome of the federal court case. See Motion for Suspension of Proceedings for the National
Association of Broadcasters at 1, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Published March 16, 2000
Regarding Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings, Copyright Office Docket No. RM
2000-3A (filed Mar. 29, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Review). The Copyright Office refused and both actions are pending. See Public Performance of
Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,840-41 (2000) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201) (notice of proposed suspension Apr. 5, 2000).
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A. Statutory Language
The language of the broadcast exemption appears to limit the scope of
the exemption to local over-the-air broadcasts. Those provisions exempt a
"nonsubscription broadcast transmission' 69  and define broadcast
transmission as one "made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as
such by the Federal Communications Commission."7 °
First, the use of the word "terrestrial" limits the scope of the statute to
over-the-air transmissions by radio stations.7' Second, the words "licensed
as such by the FCC" indicate the activities required for an FCC license,
e.g., providing certain services to local communities, are an important part
of the exemption.72 Such license requirements are irrelevant to worldwide
Internet transmissions. Third, the current nature of internet
transmissions--one-to-one communications-is different from a broadcast
where one signal is available to many parties with no requirement that
either party know the other's identity.73
Eight parties or groups filed comments with the Copyright Office. Two groups filed
comments arguing that the Copyright Office should resolve the issue and that the broadcast
exemption does not apply to the Internet: 1) groups representing major and independent
recording companies, artists and background musicians; and 2) the Digital Media Association
(DiMA) on behalf of webcasters. See Joint Comments of the Recording Industry Association of
America, Inc., Association for Independent Music, American Federation of Musicians and
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists at 1, Public Performance of Sound
Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office Docket No. RM 2000-3 (Apr. 17, 2000)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review); Comments of the Digital
Media Association at 1, Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service,
Copyright Office Docket No. RM 2000-3 (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review). The NAB, major broadcasting companies, a group of state
broadcaster associations and three other parties filed comments taking the opposite view on both
issues. See Comments of AMFM, Inc. et al. at 1, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Regarding Public Performance Of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office
Docket No. RM 2000-3, Comment Letter No. 5 (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Entertainment Law Review). Reply comments from all parties were due and submitted
by May 1, 2000. See Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed.
Reg. 14,227-28 (2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (notice of proposed rulemaking Mar.
16, 2000).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(3) (Supp. TV 1998).
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS
589 (5th ed. 1999) (noting a broadcast exemption "would not appear to mean point-to-point
herzian transmissions [because] 'broadcasting' "means a transmission to multiple simultaneous
recipients"). As originally developed, streaming technology operates in a so-called unicast
environment where a webcaster sends a separate transmission to each listener. Although new
technologies such as "multicasting," where one transmission may reach multiple listeners, are on
the horizon, they could not transform a non-exempt transmission into an exempt transmission.
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Broadcasters have argued that the exemption turns on the entity
making the transmission rather than the nature of the transmission.
74
Pointing to the definition of broadcast transmission, the broadcasters argue
that the exemption covers any transmission made by "a terrestrial broadcast
station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission. '
In other words, the exemption covers broadcasters, not broadcasts.
However, the term "broadcaster" is not found in the statute anywhere.
Rather, as explained above, Congress chose terms such as "terrestrial,"
"broadcast station" and "licensed as such by the [FCC]"-all of which have
meaning and appear to limit the exemption to local, over-the-air
transmissions. The broadcasters' argument also proves too much. Under
their interpretation, any programming transmitted by an FCC-licensed
broadcaster including Internet-only programming-would be exempt. So,
for example, to escape copyright liability, Viacom could locate MTV's
webcasting operation at the premises of a CBS radio affiliate, make
webcast transmissions from those premises and claim an exemption. Or, a
webcaster could obtain an FCC license and use it as a basis to exempt its
primary webcast business.
As discussed below, a narrow interpretation of the broadcast
exemption to cover only local, over-the-air transmissions is consistent with
a review of the context in which the DPRSRA was enacted, the stated
reasons for distinguishing broadcasters, and the reasons why, and manner
in which, the DMCA amended the DPRSRA-to clarify webcasters are
subject to the sound recording performance right.
B. Context of the DPRSRA
Congress granted sound recording copyright owners a right of public
performance in the DPRSRA in order to ensure creators of sound
recordings "will be protected as new technologies affect the ways in which
their creative works are used., 76 Congress recognized copyright law was
"inadequate to address all of the issues raised by these new technologies
dealing with the digital transmission of sound recordings ....
74. See Comments of AMFM, Inc. et al. at 20, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Regarding Public Performance Of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office
Docket No. RM 2000-3, Comment Letter No. 5 (Apr. 17, 2000) ("it is the nature of the
transmitter . .. rather than the nature of the transmission, which determines whether a
transmission (or retransmission) qualifies as a 'broadcast' transmission.") (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
75. See id. at 21.
76. S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995).
77. H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 13 (1995).
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Numerous Congressional statements contrasted local over-the-air
broadcasts with new technologies to be covered by the new performance
right. For example:
[the new law] does not affect the interests of broadcasters, as
that industry has traditionally been understood.78
If the technological status quo could be maintained, it might
well be that the current laws could be tolerated. But, we know
that technological developments such as satellite and digital
transmission of recordings make sound recordings vulnerable to
exposure to a vast audience through the initial sale of only a
potential handful of records.79
[C]opyright owners of sound recordings should enjoy protection
with respect to digital subscription, interactive and certain [other
such performances]. By contrast, free over-the-air broadcasts
are available without subscription, do not rely on interactive
delivery, and provide a mix of entertainment and non-
entertainment programming and other public interest activities
to local communities to fulfill a condition of the broadcasters'
license. The Committee has considered these factors in
concluding not to include free over-the-air broadcast services in
the legislation.80
[T]he classic example of such an exempt transmission is a
transmission to the general public by a free, over-the-air
broadcast station, such as a traditional radio or television station,
and the Committee intends that such transmissions be exempt,
regardless of whether they are in a digital or nondigital format,
in whole or in part.
78. 141 CONG. REc S948 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis
added).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 13 (emphasis added).
81. Id. As explained infra Part IV.C.1., the DMCA deleted the other exemptions for
nonsubscription transmissions, leaving only the broadcast exemption.
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These statements support the conclusion that Congress intended to exempt
radio programming only when that programming was digitally transmitted
locally, over-the-air.
Other statutory provisions of § 114, as altered by the DPRSRA,
suggest that the broadcast exemption should be limited to local over-the-air
broadcasts. For example, § 1 14(d)(1)(B) sets forth circumstances in which
a "retransmission of a radio station's broadcast transmission" is exempt.
82
By limiting the exemption to the circumstances enumerated, § 14(d)(1)(B)
contemplates certain retransmissions of radio will not be exempt.83 For
example, § 14(d)(1)(B)(iv) permits nonsubscription broadcast
retransmissions of public radio stations, provided that the broadcast is
originally made by a federally funded, noncommercial educational radio
station and "consists solely of noncommercial educational and cultural
radio programs., 84  More importantly, the exemption is limited to
retransmissions of such educational programming by "nonsubscription
terrestrial broadcasts., 85  If all nonsubscription terrestrial broadcasts were
exempt pursuant to the broadcast exemption, then this further exemption
would be unnecessary.
86
Likewise, the exemptions in § 114(d)(1)(B) are restricted to locality
in some way, demonstrating that Congress specifically intended to permit
retransmissions of radio broadcasts beyond the locality of the radio station
only in limited circumstances.87 For example, § 114(d)(1)(B)(i) limits the
exemption to cases where "the radio station's broadcast transmission is not
willfully or repeatedly retransmitted more than a radius of 150 miles from
the site of the radio broadcast transmitter."
88
82. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1998).
83. The definition of "transmission" includes both an initial transmission and a
retransmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 6)(15) (Supp. IV 1998). Thus, the exemption for
nonsubscription broadcast transmissions would apply to both initial transmissions and
retransmissions.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1 14(d)(1)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 1998).
85. Id.
86. Broadcasters have argued that provisions of § 114(d)(1)(B) are irrelevant because they
address retransmissions by third parties, not transmissions made by the broadcast station itself.
See Comments of AMFM, Inc. et al. at 26, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding
Public Performance Of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office Docket No.
RM 2000-3, Comment Letter No. 5 (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review). However, the broadcasters offer no reason why this distinction is
significant other than to support their interpretation of the statute.
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(B).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring certain retransmissions are
not broadcast outside of the 150-mile limit by satellite and cable systems). Even the exception to
this 150-mile limit supports the theme of geographical limitation running through the various
exemptions for broadcast transmissions. Section 114(d)(l)(B)(i)(I) states that the 150-mile
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Thus, the policy underlying the broadcast exemption is one of
grandfathering the traditional business of the radio industry by insulating
local, over-the-air programming from liability for sound recording
performance royalties. There is no indication that new businesses by FCC-
licensed broadcast radio stations beyond their local area, such as
webcasting, are covered. Moreover, as previously described, other
provisions of § 114(d) and accompanying legislative history support a
limitation of the broadcast exemption to local broadcasts.
C. Context of the DMCA Amendments
1. Amendments to § 114
The DMCA amendments to the DPRSRA support a narrow
interpretation of the broadcast exemption. The goal of the DMCA
amendments was "to further a stated objective of Congress when it passed
the [DPRSRA] to ensure that recording artists and record companies will
be protected as new technologies affect the ways in which their creative
works are used.' '8 9 The focus of the DMCA amendments was webcasting.90
The main purposes in enacting the DMCA amendments was to clarify
webcasting was subject to a sound recording performance right.91 The
DMCA deleted an exemption for "a nonsubscription transmission other
than a retransmission,"92 which some webcasters relied upon to argue their
transmissions were exempt. 93  As Congress explained when making the
deletion, this exemption was "the cause of confusion as to the application
of the [DPRSRA] to certain nonsubscription services (especially
webcasters) .. .94
limitation does not apply to retransmissions of nonsubscription broadcast transmissions by an
FCC-licensed "terrestrial broadcast station, terrestrial translator or terrestrial repeator." 17 U.S.C.
§1 14(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). As the legislative history explains, "a radio station's broadcast transmission
may be retransmitted by another FCC-licensed broadcast station (or translator or repeator) on a
nonsubscription basis without regard to the 150-mile restriction." S. REP. No. 104-128, at 20
(1995). The limitation to terrestrial retransmissions demonstrates that worldwide transmissions
(such as those on the Internet) were not contemplated by the DPRSRA exemptions.
89. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 79 (1998).
90. See id. at 80.
91. See id. at 79-80.
92. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 405, 112 Stat. 2868,
2890 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997)).
93. See Reply Comments of Mark Cuban at 5 n.l, In re Revisions of the Cable and Satellite
Carrier Compulsory Licenses, Copyright Office Docket No. RM 97-1, Comment Letter No. 30
(June 20, 1997) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
94. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 80.
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It is noteworthy that in addressing the treatment of webcasting,
Congress did not create any specific exemptions. Furthermore, there are no
exemptions for webcasting mentioned in the legislative history. When
explaining deletions made to clarify that webcasters are subject to the
sound recording performance right, Congress stated that the "deletion of
these two exemptions is not intended to affect the exemption for
nonsubscription broadcast transmissions." 95 This statement suggests the
broadcast exemption is unrelated to webcasting.
Likewise, neither the statutory provisions of the DMCA nor its
legislative history suggest webcasting by a "terrestrial broadcast station
licensed as such by the FCC" would be treated differently than any other
webcaster. Indeed, the definition of nonsubscription transmissions eligible
for the statutory license includes "retransmissions of broadcast
transmissions." 96 Moreover, several terms of the statutory license provide
for special treatment of retransmissions of broadcast radio that are "made
by a transmitting entity that does not have the right or ability to control the
programming of the broadcast station making the broadcast
transmission." 97 The implication of these exceptions is that retransmissions
of radio broadcasts by a station that has the right or ability to control the
programming must satisfy that statute's various terms to receive a statutory
license.
98
95. Id.
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 114()(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
97. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1998) (limiting compliance with the
"sound recording performance complement" to instances where the retransmitter is notified as to
when a broadcast station violates the complement); 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1998)
(limiting compliance with the prohibition on publishing advanced schedules or making prior
announcements of sound recordings performed); 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(iii)(IV) (Supp. IV
1998) (limiting compliance with restrictions on repeated programs); 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(vii)
(Supp. IV 1998) (limiting requirement that rebroadcasters obtain authority of a copyright owner
before transmission); 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(C)(ix) (Supp. V 1998) (limiting requirement to
display title, artist and album).
98. See David J. Wittenstein and M. Lorraine Ford, The Webcasting Wars, 2 J. INTERNET L.
1, 8(1999).
[T]he DMCA's inclusion of programming modifications, available to third-party
webcasters that license radio station content, raises questions about whether there is
a flat exemption for radio stations that feed their signals to the Web. Why should a
webcaster, such as NetRadio, that licenses a radio station signal be subject to
webcasting license fees, when the radio station itself could webcast the same
content free of performance license obligations.... [T]he flip side of the
exemptions from programming and playlist restrictions available to secondary
webcasters is that retransmitters that do have the right and ability to control the
original broadcast programming-namely, radio station webcasters-are required
to comply with the range of licensing requirements ....
Id. at 8-9.
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Broadcasters have argued that, unlike the DPRSRA, the DMCA was
enacted with little debate and did not change the broadcast exemption.99
This, they argue, is in contrast to the detailed discussions that took place
before the DPRSRA was enacted.100 It is unlikely, broadcasters argue, that
Congress would make the same broadcast programming that it historically
exempted subject to licensing in a new medium without any explanation in
the legislative history. 10'
While it is correct that the DMCA amendments were enacted more
quickly than the DPRSRA and the legislative history for the DMCA is
more brief than that of the DPRSRA, there is ample evidence of Congress'
intent when it enacted the DMCA amendments. As discussed above, the
overriding reason behind the DMCA amendments was to clarify that
webcasting is subject to the sound recording performance right.1
0 2
Strong policy reasons also militate in favor of concluding that the
broadcast exemption does not extend beyond local, over-the-air
transmissions. Webcasts of broadcast programming compete with other
webcasts for audience and advertising revenue. Thus, extending the
broadcast exemption to the Internet would give broadcasters an unfair
competitive advantage in a new entertainment medium with new business
opportunities. 10 3  There appears to be no justification for granting
preferential treatment to broadcasters for transmitting their local AM/FM
signal to listeners worldwide based on an exemption rooted in traditional,
FCC-regulated activity of serving local audiences.!
0 4
99. See Comments of AMFM, Inc. et al. at 30, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Regarding Public Performance Of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office
Docket No. RM 2000-3, Comment Letter No. 5 (Apr. 17, 2000) (quoting DMCA legislative
history that new law "is not intended to affect the exemption for nonsubscription broadcast
transmissions.") (emphasis omitted) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Review).
100. See id. at 29.
101. See id. at 30.
102. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.
103. See Comments of the Digital Media Association at 5-6, Public Performance of Sound
Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office Docket No. RM 2000-3 (Apr. 17, 2000)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review) (explaining why "an
exemption for a broadcaster's Internet retransmissions of its broadcast signals would introduce
significant and unanticipated competitive distortions into the Internet marketplace").
104. Broadcasters also argue that many broadcasters might be forced to make fundamental
changes to their programming in order to qualify for the statutory license. See Comments of
AMFM, Inc. et al. at 31, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Public Performance Of
Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office Docket No. RM 2000-3, Comment
Letter No. 5 (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
For example, the broadcaster comments claim that traditional broadcast programming often
violates the sound recording performance complement or fails to preannounce songs. See id.
They claim that without making changes necessary to qualify for the statutory license,
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2. Amendments to § 112
The DMCA amendments to § 112, governing the making of
ephemeral recordings, also support the conclusion that the broadcast
exemption does not extend to the Internet. Before the DPRSRA and
DMCA, § 112 provided a limited exemption for reproductions of sound
recordings'0 5 made to facilitate a licensed or exempt transmission. The
purpose of the exemption was to permit certain "transmitting
organizations," including FCC-licensed radio stations, to tape programs
prior to their broadcast without incurring copyright liability. 0 6 These
transmitting organizations did not have to pay fees for publicly performing
sound recordings. Thus, the ephemeral recording exemption ensured
copies expressly made for certain exempt performances did not provide a
basis for copyright liability.0 7
The DMCA amended § 112 in two ways. First, Congress amended §
112(a) to include an ephemeral recording exemption for "a transmission
organization that is a broadcast radio or television station licensed as such
by the [FCC] and that makes a broadcast transmission of a performance of
a sound recording in a digital format .... ,,108 The purpose of this change
was to allow broadcasters to enjoy the ephemeral recording exemption
when they converted their over-the-air analog signal to digital.1 09 As the
legislative history explains, the amendment "changed the existing language
of the ephemeral recording exemption (redesignated as § 112(a)(1)) to
extend explicitly to broadcasters the same privilege they already enjoy with
respect to analog broadcasts."110 However, the legislative history did not
broadcasters would be required to obtain separate licenses from individual copyright owners.
Broadcasters argue that it is "inconceivable" that Congress intended to force such changes in light
of Congress' historical exemption of traditional broadcast radio. See id. However, the
broadcasters' assertion is inconsistent with the fact that more than a thousand broadcasters have
filed a notice indicating that they are operating under (and therefore comply with) the terms of the
statutory license. See U.S. Copyright Office, Directory of Services that have filed Initial Notices
of Digital Transmissions of Sound Recordings made under Statutory License (last modified Mar.
31, 2000) <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/licensing/notice/index.html>.
105. The exemption also covers musical works. See 17 U.S.C. § 112(c) (1994).
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 110-12 (1976).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
108. id.
109. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 59 (1998). This clarification was necessary because §
112(a) exempted only ephemeral recordings made to facilitate transmissions exempt under §
114(a), which addressed the exemption for performances of sound recordings in analog form
only. See id.
110. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 22 (1998).
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indicate this change included webcasts by an FCC-licensed broadcast radio
station."'
Second, Congress created a statutory license to cover multiple
ephemeral recordings made by 1) transmitting organizations, such as
webcasters, operating under the statutory license for performances and 2)
transmitting organizations making transmissions to business establishments
exempt under § 11 4(d)(1)(C)(iv). 12  For the most part, this statutory
license was a response to the many webcasters who wished to reproduce
multiple copies of sound recordings in different formats for play, on
different servers, or to encode recordings for transmission at different
transmission rates."1 3 These are four conditions that must be satisfied in
order to become eligible for a statutory license"
14
What do these changes tell us about the scope of the broadcast
exemption? As discussed above, the DMCA amendments to the sound
recording performance right were designed primarily to address
webcasting. 115 Section 112(e) addresses a particular concern of webcasters
that the § 112(a) exemption, which is limited to one ephemeral copy, is
insufficient to address a webcaster's need to make multiple ephemeral
copies as described above. 16 These reasons apply equally to webcasting of
over-the-air broadcast transmissions.
While the statutory license for multiple ephemeral recordings in §
112(e) is available for webcasters operating under the statutory license in §
114(0, it does not apply to transmissions made under the broadcast
111. This is underscored by the fact that the amendment occurred before the webcasting
issues ever arose as part of the DMCA legislative debate. The Senate Report, which included this
change, was made May 11, 1998. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1 (1998). The webcasting issues
arose later and are discussed in the Conference Reports on October 8, 1998. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 105-796, at 78-89 (1998). Moreover, the Senate Report characterizes the change for
broadcasters in § 112(a)(l) as "digital broadcasts" without mentioning the Internet. See S. REP.
No. 105-190, at 22 (1998).
112. 17 U.S.C. § I 14(d)(l)(c)(iv) (Supp. IV 1998).
113. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-796, at 89-90 (1998).
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) (Supp. IV 1998). Generally, to be eligible for the ephemeral
recordings statutory license, the transmitter must meet the following conditions: 1) The
phonorecord must be retained and solely used by the transmitter and the transmitter can not make
any further copies; 2) the phonorecord can only be used by a transmitter entitled to a statutory
license under § 114(f) or under the § 114(d)(1)(C)(iv) exemption for business establishments in
the course of business; 3) the ephemeral recording is destroyed within six months of the first
public transmission; and 4) the copyright owner has authorized the transmitter to transmit the
recording and the ephemeral recording is made from a lawfully made and obtained phonorecord.
See 17 U.S.C. § 112(eX3)(A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1998).
115. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e).
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exemption."17 Thus, multiple recordings made for programming falling
under the broadcast exemption are subject to the exclusive rights of sound
recording copyright owners. However, there is no reason to believe
Congress would grant exclusive rights for multiple ephemeral recordings
for webcasts of over-the-air broadcast programming to sound recording
copyright owners, but grant all other webcasters a statutory license to make
ephemeral recordings. This indicates the broadcast exemption does not
cover webcasting and that webcasts by broadcast stations are eligible for
statutory licensing.
This statutory interpretation is also supported by § 112(a)(1). If
webcasts of over-the-air broadcast programming are covered by the
broadcast exemption and not the statutory license in § 114(f), then the
exemption for the first ephemeral recording by an FCC-licensed
broadcaster making webcasts would only be exempt if some other part of §
112(a)(1) applied. The only conceivable language in § 112(a)(1) that could
exempt a webcast by an FCC-licensed broadcaster is the new language
exempting an ephemeral recording made for a digital broadcast
transmission of a sound recording by an FCC-licensed radio station.' 1
8
However, a condition of the exemption in § 112(a)(1) is that the
ephemeral recording is used "solely for the transmitting organization's own
transmissions within its local service area.... ,," 9 As previously
discussed, the legislative history of the DMCA makes clear the change to §
112(a) was intended "to extend explicitly to broadcasters the same
privilege they already enjoy with respect to analog broadcasts. 120 Thus,
the term "local service area" as it relates to FCC-licensed broadcast radio
should be construed consistently with its meaning prior to the DMCA
amendments.
The House Report to the 1976 Copyright Act states "[t]he term 'local
service area' is defined in section 11 l(f)" 121 Section 11 (f) provides that
the local service area of a radio broadcast station is the service area of the
station "pursuant to the rules and regulations of the [FCC].' ' 122 Thus, local
service area in § 112(a)(1), as it relates to digital broadcasts by an FCC-
licensed radio broadcast station, means the geographical area in which the
radio station is located. Accordingly, webcasts by FCC-licensed broadcast
radio stations, which are available worldwide, would not come within the
117. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112(e), 114(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
118. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 59.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1998).
120. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 59.
121. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 103 (1976).
122. 17 U.S.C. § IIl(f) (Supp. IV 1998).
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language of § 112(a)(1) exempting an ephemeral recording made for a
digital broadcast by a station.
123
It is inconceivable that Congress would deny an FCC-licensed
broadcast radio station an exemption for an initial ephemeral recording or a
statutory license for multiple ephemeral recordings for webcasts.
Therefore, the more plausible interpretation of § 112 is the first ephemeral
recording for a webcast by an FCC-licensed radio station is exempt because
such a webcast is made pursuant to the statutory license in § 114(f), and
multiple ephemeral recordings are eligible for a statutory license for the
same reason.
Thus, the newly enacted provisions of § 112 and § 114 do not reflect
any intent to grant special treatment for webcasting by an FCC-licensed
radio broadcast station. The DMCA's stated purpose of protecting sound
recordings as new technologies emerge, specifically those on the Internet,
should apply equally to all webcasters.
V. CONCLUSION
Resolution of the issues addressed in this Article will significantly
impact the enjoyment, consumption and use of sound recordings through
new technologies and media. Although the issues discussed within this
Article are currently the most topical regarding sound recording
performance rights, additional issues will undoubtedly arise as new
business models test the labyrinth of legal provisions governing these
rights.
123. Broadcasters have argued that because the exemption in section 112(a)(1) also applies
to webcasters, the meaning of the term "local service area" was necessarily expanded and
therefore is not limited to a radio station's local audience. See Reply Comments of AMFM, Inc.
et al. at 36, In re Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Public Performance Of Sound
Recordings: Definition of a Service, Copyright Office Docket No. RM 2000-3, Reply Comment
Letter No. 6 (May 1, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
However, giving the term "local service area" a different meaning for webcasters (e.g.,
worldwide) than for FCC-licensed broadcast radio stations making webcasts (e.g., the local
geographical area around the station) is consistent with the statute before the DMCA. See 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18[E][4][b][ii], at 8-245
n.195 (1999) (stating a network station is defined as one having nationwide transmissions).
Moreover, the broadcasters' interpretation would render the term "local service area"
meaningless.
